



PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL IMMUNE FROM
SHERMAN ACT AS A TEAM SPORT NOT
CONSTITUTING INTERSTATE COMMERCE
A professional football player at one time under contract to a team
in the National Football League violated his contract's standard "reserve
clause":' by signing to play for a team in the rival All-America Conference;
as a result he was suspended by the league from employment with any
league team for five years and allegedly blacklisted from employment with
a Pacific Coast League team. He brought an action against the National
Football League and others for treble damages and injunctive relief under
the Sherman Act,2 alleging that the reserve clause and suspension provi-
sions contained in all player contracts of teams in the defendant league were
part of a conspiracy by league members to eliminate competition for players'
services and hence constituted an attempted monopoly and undue restraint
on interstate commerce. The district court dismissed the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that football
was a team sport like baseball 3 and hence was not interstate commerce
within the meaning of the antitrust laws.4  Radovich v. National Football
League, 231 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. granted, 25 U.S.L. WEEK
3093 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1956) (No. 94).
To be subject to the Sherman Act an enterprise must be engaged in
"commerce among the several states." 5 Professional sports would appear
to come within this concept since personal effort has been held commerce,6
the league organizations include teams operating regularly in many states,
1. The reserve clause in a player contract grants the club which holds the contract
a right to renew the contract on essentially the same terms, and provides that the
player shall not be eligible to play for any other team or league without the parent
team's assent. There are also league-imposed provisions for outlawing a player if he
should break his contract to play for some other team, as in the instant case. See Com-
ment, 62 YAiu L.J. 576, 585-94 (1953) ; Note, 53 COLUm. L. Rzv. 242, 243-44 (1953).
For an example of a major league baseball contract containing a reserve clause, see
Hearings Before the Subcommittee, on Study of Monopoly Power of the House Com-
ninttee on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 1, pt. 6, at 1248-52 (1951). Profes-
sional hockey and basketball use similar reserve clauses. Id. at 1454, 1504-05.
2. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1952).
3. See Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
4. The court held alternatively that the plaintiff had not alleged sufficient facts
to show a conspiracy against the public interest. Instant case at 622-23.
5. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
6. United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955) (legitimate stage); United
States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485 (1950) (real estate




and often the games are transmitted in interstate commerce by radio and
television.7 But in 1922 the Supreme Court, in Federal Baseball Club v.
National League,8 decided that professional baseball was then neither
"commerce" nor "interstate," and refused to consider whether certain of its
practices were antitrust violations. Some of the lower courts subsequently
faced with this question followed the authority of Federal Baseball,9 but
others held the extent of modern radio and television coverage sufficient to
distinguish that case.10  Congress, meanwhile, took no action. Although
several bills were introduced to exempt professional sports from the anti-
trust laws," the bills were reported unfavorably from committee on the
grounds that the projected exemptions were too broad 2 and that a limited
exemption for the reserve clause was unnecessary so long as the courts
might uphold such a clause under the rule of reason.' 3  However, the
Supreme Court's 1953 decision in Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc.14
returned the problem to Congress, reaffirming Federal Baseball's con-
clusion without re-examining the underlying issues in view of congressional
inaction and the intervening development of baseball in reliance on that
decision. On the other hand, in the more recent case of United States v.
International Boxing Club '15 the Court held professional boxing interstate
commerce and therefore subject to antitrust, distinguishing Toolson as
involving the continuance of a previously granted exemption. The result-
ing uncertainty as to the scope of the Federal Baseball-Toolson exemption
7. Transmission in interstate commerce by television and radio has been held
sufficient to bring an enterprise within the antitrust laws. United States v. Interna-
tional Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955); cf. Associated Press v. United States, 326
U.S. 1 (1945) (dissemination of news); United States v. Crescent Amusement Co.,
323 U.S. 173 (1944) (transporting movie films); United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (communication by telephone, telegraph
and mail).
8. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
9. Corbett v. Chandler, 202 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1953) ; Kowalski v. Chandler, 202
F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1953).
10. Martin v. National League, 174 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1949); Gardella v. Chand-
ler, 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949) ; cf. United States v. National Football League, 116
F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953) (holding subject to the antitrust laws a professional
football league's bylaws restricting radio and television coverage of football games,
since television and radio are in interstate commerce regardless of the status of foot-
ball).
11. H.R. 4229, 4230, 4231 and S. 1526, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1951). Hearings were
held on the House bills but not on the Senate bill. See Hearings, supra note 1.
12. "The requested exemption would extend to all professional sports enterprises
and to all acts in the conduct of such enterprises. The law would no longer require
competition in any facet of business activity of any sport enterprise. Thus the sale
of radio and television rights, the management of stadia, the purchase and sale of
advertising, the concession industry, and many other business activities, as well as the
aspects of baseball which are solely related to the promotion of competition on the
playing field, would be immune and untouchable. Such a broad exemption could not
be granted without substantially repealing the antitrust laws. . . . If a blanket im-
munity were granted, all appeal to the courts from a possible arbitrary decision by
the rulers of professional baseball would be foreclosed." H.R. R. No. 2002, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 230 (1950) (hereinafter cited as HousX RV.o T.)
13. Id. at 231.
14. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
15. 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
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is reflected in the opinion of the instant court, which applied the baseball
doctrine to professional football by reasoning that, if it was the intent
of Congress as interpreted in Toolson to exempt organized baseball from
the antitrust laws, then the exemption logically extended to other sports
sufficiently like baseball to have the same modus operandi.1'
It must be conceded that there appears no significant difference be-
tween baseball and football for antitrust purposes, but nevertheless the
rationale of the instant court is questionable. The Supreme Court has
indicated that in Federal Baseball it was "dealing with the business of
baseball and nothing else." 17 On this basis it would seem that if, as the
Court has since observed, Toolson's reaffirmance of Federal Baseball
"was a narrow application of the rule of stare decisis," I then neither
Toolson nor Federal Baseball is authority for extending the antitrust
exemption to other sports. Indeed, in International Boxing the Court
expressly noted that the baseball decisions provide no immunity for
other sports, for which the issue of exemption "is for Congress to re-
solve, not this Court." 19 At the same time, there seems little founda-
tion for the instant court's assumption of congressional intent to exempt
team sports-or even baseball alone. Such congressional activity as there
has been in the area has consisted of unsuccessful efforts to exempt profes-
sional sports from the antitrust laws,20 apparently in recognition of the ex-
panded interpretation of interstate commerce since 1922,21 and these efforts
have failed for reasons that appear totally inconsistent with any inference
of aquiescence in the blanket exemption provided by Federal Baseball.
22
The House subcommittee's report on these proposals clearly disapproved
a general exemption such as resulted from Federal Baseball. Extension
of organized baseball's complete exemption to other sports, therefore, can
hardly be deduced from the actions of Congress. Although Congress may
be said to have indicated tentative accord in a limited exemption for the
reserve clause,m this appears irrelevant to the issue of complete exemption
involved in the instant case.24  But regardless of these weaknesses which
16. Instant case at 622.
17. United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 228 (1955).
18. Id. at 230; see also United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236,
249 (1955) (dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter, who had been with the major-
ity in Toolson).
19. Id. at 242-43.
20. See note 11 supra.
21. See HousE REPORT 134-35. Toolson has been criticized as ignoring this devel-
opment and the fact that baseball has expanded its activities since 1922. See Note,
68 HIav. L. REv. 96, 136 (1954). See also REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAI.'S
NATIONAL COMMITrE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 62-63 (1955).
22. See text at notes 11-13 mspra. But cf. the Court's observation in Toolson that
"Congress has had the [Federal Baseball] ruling under consideration but has not seen
fit to bring such businesses under these laws by legislation having prospective effect."
346 U.S. at 357.
23. See Housi Rt2oRr 231.
24. Furthermore, while intervening congressional silence provided a basis for the
Court's conclusion in Toolson, that conclusion expressly limited its reaffirmance of
Federal Baseball only "so far as that decision determines that Congress had no inten-
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are inherent in the use of Toolson as authority, the facts of the instant
case remain essentially indistinguishable from those of the baseball cases.
While the Supreme Court's later statements narrowing the effect of
Toolson 2 provide a possible escape from its authority, the instant court
has but logically applied the illogic of Toolson.
The instant court's result may, however, have some economic justifica-
tion. Professional team sports are unique in having their market vary
directly with the intensity of inter-team competition; unless teams are of
comparable strength the public will not pay to see them compete. A
number of restrictive practices are therefore employed 26 which, it is
argued, are necessary for the economic welfare of the sport. 7 The re-
serve clause-the alleged violation in the instant case and a device com-
mon to professional team sports 2 8-is designed to prevent unrestricted
bidding for player talent such as would enable the richer teams to so out-
balance the poorer teams that competition would be destroyed. Since
such practices might be invalidated as antitrust violations, those who are
convinced that team sports could not survive without their protection feel
that the courts are justified in refusing to classify team sports as interstate
commerce within the meaning of the Sherman Act.2 9 The danger in-
herent in this view is twofold: it prevents the courts from determining
the alleged necessity of such player restraints, and it precludes judicial
examination of practices unrelated to the fielding of teams. 0 A more
sound approach would be to recognize that professional sports are subject
to the antitrust laws as interstate commerce and then view their restrictive
tion of including the business of baseball within the scope of the antitrust laws." 346
U.S. at 357. (Emphasis added.) This qualification obviously relates to a congressional
intent determined in 1922, and its ambiguity is apparent. It may confine Toolson's ap-
proval of Federal Baseball to the extent that Federal Baseball found a specific legis-
lative intention to exempt organized baseball. However, Toolson would then seem to
reaffirm nothing, because Federal Baseball neither made nor purported to make such
a finding. Alternatively, Toolson's qualification may have referred to a general deter-
mination that Congress did not intend the antitrust laws to cover businesses not in
interstate commerce, but it then is a meaningless tautology leaving little justification
for the Court's refusal to determine whether baseball has since become "interstate
commerce." The Court's subsequent statements that "Toolson neither overruled ...
nor necessarily reaffirmed all that was said in Federal Baseball," United States v. In-
ternational Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, 242 (1955); see United States v. Shubert,
348 U.S. 222, 230 (1955), do not lessen the obscurity of Toolson's holding. By either
interpretation of the Court's qualification, Toolson seems authority only for the con-
clusion that Federal Baseball's result should stand until Congress rejects it, regardless
of whether baseball is presently interstate commerce, and does not necessarily afford
a basis for any inference as to congressional intent.
25. See text at notes 17-19 supra.
26. E.g., "farm systems" and "territorial rights," in addition to the reserve clause.
For a discussion of these practices as evidenced in baseball, see Comment, Monopsony
in Manpower: Baseball Meets the Antitrust Laws, 62 Y=LZ L.J. 576 (1953). Other
professional sports have patterned their operations after baseball. See note 1 supra.
27. Eckler, Baseball-Sport or Commerce?, 17 U. CHI. L. Rzv. 56, 72-74 (1949);
Comment, 62 YALE L.J. 576, 627 (1953).
28. See note 1 supra.
29. Eckler, supra note 27, at 77-78; see Comment, 62 YALE LJ. 576, 612-13, 627
(1953).
30. See note 12 supra.
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practices in light of the rule of reason.3 ' To this the objection has
been advanced that some practices necessary to maintain competition-
such as the reserve clause, which has the effect of price-fixing 32 by
eliminating buyer competition, and the sanction against non-conforming
players, which takes the form of a boycott as might be found "illegal per
se," thus forestalling consideration of the reasonableness of the activity. 4
However, this contention assumes that the courts must apply the "viola-
tion per se" doctrine in every case where a particular type of restraint
is alleged, without regard to the exigencies of the industry in which the
restraint is employed. Actually, courts have applied the rule of reason
in price-fixing3 5 and boycott cases .3  It does not follow, therefore, that
a court must label a practice as "illegal per se" merely because it has been
so labeled in some other context.3 7 Since the rule of reason furnishes
an adequate doctrine to deal with the merits, the question of interstate
commerce seems an improper level at which to invoke the courts' sympathy
with the economic needs of the industry. If a practice used by team sports
cannot survive the rule of reason, and is still defended as necessary, its
exemption would then be a matter for Congress rather than the courts.
Meanwhile, the courts would have a flexibility to investigate other extra-
competitive restraints which is not available under artificial tests such as
the "team sport" dichotomy adopted by the instant court.
31. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) ; Appalachian Coals,
Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); Board of Trade v. United States, 246
U.S. 231 (1918).
32. Price-fixing agreements are considered the classic example of "violations per
se." See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Oppenheim,
Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50
Micu. L. Rzv. 1139, 1150-51 (1952). The fact that in the case of sports the prices
fixed are for services instead of commodities would not prevent the application of the
"per se" doctrine. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S.
485 (1950) (brokerage services).
33. Boycotts have also been held "illegal per se." Fashion Originators' Guild, Inc.
v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Eastern States Lumber Ass'n v. United States, 234
U.S. 600 (1914) ; see HousE REPORT 138. For a discussion of the possible application
of this doctrine to other aspects of baseball, see Comment, 62 YALE L.J. 576, 624-26
(1953).
34. Under the "illegal per se" doctrine certain restraints are in themselves con-
clusively unreasonable and the defendant may not try to justify his actions by an
economic argument; he may only defend by refuting those facts proving the restraint.
See United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392 (1927) ; Timken Roller Bearing
Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
35. See, e.g., Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933) ; Board
of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); United States v. Morgan, 118 F.
Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
36. E.g., Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936); United
States v. Insurance Board, 144 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. 1956); cf. United States v.
National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
37. Cf. The statement of judge Medina: "I can find nothing in any of these cases
which would lead me to conclude that the rule of reason has been abandoned or dis-
carded. Moreover the basic principles of the Chicago Board of Trade and the Appa-
lachian Coals cases has never been repudiated .... Despite all the general condem-
nation of price-fixing, I find nothing in any of these cases which can be regarded as
controlling precedent here or which binds me to hold the clauses of these syndicate
agreements now under attack to be illegal per se under the Sherman Act." United
States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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Civil Rights-
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF DENIED TO RESTRAIN
VIOLATION OF STATE CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTE
IMPOSING PRESCRIBED PENALTIES
An Ohio statute prohibiting racial discrimination at places of public
accommodation and amusement provides criminal prosecution or statutory
civil damages for breach.' Plaintiff was denied admission to defend-
ant's amusement park solely because of her race.2 Instead of pursuing
a remedy provided by the statute, she sought to enjoin defendant from
denying her admission to the park when it was open to the public.3 The
trial court granted the injunction,4 but the Ohio Court of Appeals re-
versed.5 The Ohio Supreme Court, affirming the decision of the court
of appeals, held that the civil rights statute, in creating a crime unknown
at common law, must be strictly construed, and consequently relief must
be limited to those remedies specifically set forth in the statute. Fletcher
V. Coney Island, Inc., 134 N.E.2d 371 (Ohio 1956).
At common law, innkeepers and common carriers were obliged to
serve without discrimination all who sought service, but owners and
operators of private places of amusement were under no such obligation.6
Twenty-two American jurisdictions now have statutes prohibiting dis-
crimination on the basis of race or color.7  None of these enactments
1. OHIO REV. COD ANN. §§ 2901.35-.36 (Page 1954) provides that violators "shall
be fined not less than fifty nor more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not less
than thirty nor more than ninety days, or both and shall pay not less than fifty nor
more than five hundred dollars to the person aggrieved thereby....
"Either a judgment in favor of the person aggrieved, or the punishment of the
offender upon an indictment . . . is a bar to further prosecution. . ....
2. Fletcher v. Coney Island, Inc., 54 Ohio Op. 112, 116, 121 N.E.2d 574, 581
(Hamilton County C.P. 1954).
3. On the days plaintiff sought admission to defendant's park it was operated
under "outing contracts" which vested in the renting organization the right to desig-
nate who could be excluded from the park. Except for persons so excluded, the park
remained open to the general public. The trial court held that the renting organiza-
tions received the same right of exclusion as the amusement park owner, and that this
right could not be used to discriminate on the basis of race or color. Fletcher v. Coney
Island, Inc., 54 Ohio Op. 112, 114, 121 N.E.2d 574, 579-80 (Hamilton County C.P.
1954).
4. Fletcher v. Coney Island, Inc., supra note 3.
5. Fletcher v. Coney Island, Inc., 100 Ohio App. 259 (1955) ; see instant case at
373.
6. Bailey v. Washington Theater Co., 218 Ind. 513, 520,34 N.E.2d 17, 19 (1941);
see Annot., 7 A.L.R.2d 1165 (1948) and cases cited therein.
7. See Note, 39 COLUM. L. Rsv. 986, 996 n.66 (1939) for a list of statutes in effect
in 1939. Since then, four jurisdictions have enacted civil rights statutes. ALASA
CoiiP. LAws ANN. §§ 20-1-3 to 1-4 (1949) ; MONT. RZV. CODs ANN. § 64-211 (Supp.
1955) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 49-8-1 to 8-6 (Supp. 1955) ; P.R. LAWs ANN. tit. 1, § 13
(1954). These statutes were modeled after the Federal Civil Rights Statute which, inter
alia, prohibited discrimination in "inns, public conveyances . . ., theaters, and other
public places of amusement. . . ." Civil Rights Act, §§ 1, 2, 18 STAT. 335 (1875).
This part of the federal statute was declared unconstitutional. Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3 (1883). The remaining portions of the federal statute, 16 STAT. 144 (1870),
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1952) ; 14 STAT. 27 (1866), 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1952) ; 17 STAT. 13
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specifically provides injunctive relief.8 While early cases indicated that
an injunction could not be obtained under these statutes,9 California 1 D
and Pennsylvania 11 have recently permitted such relief.'2 The obvious
purpose of the civil rights statutes is to protect minority groups from
arbitrary discrimination. 13 Yet, statutory remedies for damages and crim-
inal prosecution have generally proved inadequate to accomplish this ob-
jective. 14 Prosecutions are rare, for public prosecutors are loath to take
action and victims are reluctant to assume the cost of suit in view of small
recoveries. 15 Moreover, jurors sharing the prejudices of the defendant
often refuse to find against him.16 On the other hand, injunctive relief
would provide an effective remedy, and its foreclosure may amount to a
denial of the very rights the legislature attempted to guarantee.'
7
The instant court based its decision to withhold injunctive relief on
the maxim that remedies under a statute creating an offense unknown at
common law should be limited to those specifically provided by the
statute.18 This maxim has been applied to deny relief in a form not
(1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1952), require states to provide equal rights under the law
and equal property rights to all citizens. For a discussion of federal civil rights legis-
lation, see Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MicH. L.
Rim. 1323 (1952).
8. All of the statutes except those of Montana and New Mexico provide spe-
cifically for either civil or criminal penalties, or both. Penalties are not set forth in
the aforementioned statutes. But see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3268d (Supp. 1955), which
provides for a complaint to the Commission on Civil Rights. This commission has
wide powers to make regulations consistent with the acts it administers. CONN. GXr.
STAT. § 7404 (1949). Presumably, it could order a violator of the civil rights statute
to stop doing the act constituting the violation.
9. Woollcott v. Shubert, 169 App. Div. 194, 154 N.Y. Supp. 643 (1st Dep't 1915);
Tate v. Eidelman, 32 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 478 (Mahoning County C.P. 1934); White
v. Pasfield, 212 Ill. App. 73 (1918) (alternative holding); see 29 HARV. L. Rav. 93
(1915); cf. Annot., 171 A.L.R. 920, 921 (1947). But see Grannon v. Westchester
Racing Ass'n, 16 App. Div. 6, 19, 44 N.Y. Supp. 790, 797 (2d Dep't 1897).
10. Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc., 30 Cal. 2d 110, 180 P.2d 321 (1947).
11. Everett v. Harron, 380 Pa. 123, 110 A.2d 383 (1955).
12. See also Gillespie v. Lake Shore Golf Club, Inc., 91 N.E.2d 290 (Cuyahoga
County, Ohio Ct. App. 1950), overruled by instant case.
13. See Goostree, The Iowa Civil Rights Statute: A Problem of Enforcement, 37
IOWA L. Ry. 242, 245 (1952).
14. See instant case at 377 (dissenting opinion); KoNvirz, TnH CONSTITUTION
AND CIvIL RIGHTS 124 (1946) ; Moscovitz, Civil Liberties and Injuiwtive Protection,
39 ILL. L. Rv. 144 (1944).
15. KoNviTz, op. cit. supra note 14, at 124; Maslow & Robison, Civil Rights Leg-
islation and the Fight for Equality, 1865-1952, 20 U. CHi. L. RXv. 363, 406 (1953).
16. Goostree, supra note 13, at 244 and authorities cited in note 15 supra.
17. Moscovrrz, supra note 14; 30 CAx.iv. L. Rav. 563 (1942).
18. Cf. Rex v. Robinson, 2 Burr. 799, 97 Eng. Rep. 568 (K.B. 1759). The in-
stant court cited two nineteenth-century cases in support of this maxim: Commission-
ers v. Bank, 32 Ohio St. 194 (1877) (embezzlement statute provided double damages
as penalty to be used to compensate victim; additional civil damages were therefore
denied); Zanesville v. Fannan, 53 Ohio St. 605, 42 N.E. 703 (1895) (remedy not
provided by statute allowed because offense was known at common law; reference
to the maxim was dictum). See SmDwicK, INTERPRZTATION AND APPLICATION OP
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 94 (1857).
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provided by statute when granting the remedy requested would lead to a
result not contemplated by the statute such as the personal liability of
persons not included within the statute's terms,19 the imposition of higher
monetary penalties 20 or restriction of property 2 1 valued above the liabilities
provided, or imprisonment under a statute providing only for a fine. z2
No such problem is posed, however, by the instant case, since here in-
junctive relief would have no result beyond compelling defendant's com-
pliance with the statute. Furthermore, courts have granted relief not
specifically provided where statutory remedies are inadequate to accomplish
the legislative object and the relief sought would achieve that object.m
In cases involving civil rights statutes, other courts have granted damages
for violations where only criminal remedies were provided, 24 and the recent
California and Pennsylvania cases 2 granted the injunctive relief re-
quested here. While the latter cases might be distinguished because Cali-
fornia and Pennsylvania have abolished the maxim that statutes in dero-
gation of the common law are to be strictly construed,26 the same relief
could be granted by applying the policy-enacted into statute in Ohio 27
that remedial statutes shall be liberally construed in order to promote their
objectives.28 By basing its decision on maxims rather than examining the
19. E.g., Connell v. Lazar, 196 Misc. 757, 759, 94 N.Y.S.2d 235, 237 (Sup. Ct.
1949) (alleged conspirator could not be sued for damages under emergency rent law
since penalties under the act applied only to landlord) ; Johnston v. Stromon Motor
Supply Co., 182 Okla. 126, 127, 76 P2d 373, 375 (1938) (vendee could not be sued
personally under fraudulent conveyance act providing for in rem proceedings).
20. E.g., People v. Craycroft, 2 Cal. 243, 244 (1852) (recovery of unpaid license
fees of $4,000 denied in prosecution for unlicensed operations where act provided only
$100 to $1,000 fine); Gales v. Weldon, 282 S.W.2d 522, 528-29 (Mo. 1955) (punitive
damages denied in suit brought under blue sky law providing for recovery of pur-
chase price, court costs and attorney's fees).
21. E.g., Turner v. Harris, 281 S.W2d 661, 665 (Tenn. 1955) (injunction re-
fused against sale of defendants land where automobile financial responsibility act
provided only loss of license and registration for failure to post requisite security).
22. Rex v. Robinson, 2 Burr. 799, 97 Eng. Rep. 568 (K.B. 1759).
23. E.g., Ex parte Wood, 194 Cal. 49, 227 Pac. 908 (1924) (defendants enjoined
from violating statute prohibiting syndicalism where statute provided imprisonment) ;
State ex rel. Jackson v. Lindsay, 85 Kan. 79, 116 Pac. 207 (1911) (operation of insane
asylum without a license enjoined even though such operation might not constitute
a common-law nuisance and licensing statute provided only fine as remedy); Schramm
v. Bank, 143 Ore. 546, 573, 20 P.2d 1093, 1102 (1933) (illegally-pledged security re-
covered in suit against creditor of insolvent bank, where statutory remedy of fine and
imprisonment applied only to debtor's officials) ; compare State ex rel. Breslin v. Todd,
8 Wash. 2d 482, 113 P.2d 315 (1941) (mandamus denied to compel official to rein-
state veteran discharged in violation of statute which provided fine as its remedy),
with Anderson v. Pantages Theater Co., 114 Wash. 24, 194 Pac. 813 (1921) (civil
damages permitted under civil rights statute providing only criminal penalties).
24. Bolden v. Grand Rapids Operating Corp., 239 Mich. 218, 214 N.W. 241
(1927); Anderson v. Pantages Theater Co., 114 Wash. 24, 194 Pac. 813 (1921).
25. Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc., 30 Cal. 2d 110, 180 P.2d 321 (1947);
Everett v. Harron, 380 Pa. 123, 110 A.2d 383 (1955).
26. CAX. CIv. CoDa § 4 (Deering 1949) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit 46, § 558 (Purdon
1952).
27. OHio Rr-v. CODE ANN. § 1.11 (Page 1953).
28. See 2 SUTHEaLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTiON §§ 3302, 3304-05 (3d ed. 1943);
cf. Anderson v. Pantages Theater Co., 114 Wash. 24, 27, 194 Pac. 813, 815 (1921).
The Ohio Court of Appeals in the instant case distinguished the California civil
rights statute on the ground that, unlike the Ohio statute, it did not require an election
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policies and underlying facts of the instant case, and refusing to follow the
more enlightened decisions of other states in similar situations, the Ohio
Supreme Court has unnecessarily weakened that state's civil rights statute
and run counter to the policy of recent cases 29 removing arbitrary racial
restrictions.
Criminal Law-
COURTS SPLIT ON WHETHER "STOLEN" AS USED IN
DYER ACT IS RESTRICTED TO LARCENY OR INCLUDES
EMBEZZLEMENT AND FALSE PRETENSES
In Maryland, Turley borrowed a car to drive some friends to their
homes. After completing the trip he drove to another state where he
sold the car. In Oklahoma, a purchaser who was unable to maintain
payments on his automobile gave possession of it to Smith with the under-
standing that Smith would return the car to the finance company or assume
the payments himself. Smith failed to contact the finance company and
subsequently used the car to make two extensive interstate trips. Turley
and Smith were each charged with violation of the Dyer Act, which
makes it a federal offense to transport in interstate commerce automobiles
known to have been "stolen." 1 The District Court of Maryland granted
Turley's motion to dismiss, holding that the word "stolen" as used in the
Dyer Act requires proof of common-law larceny, whereas the informa-
tion charged an act of embezzlement. United States v. Turley, 141
F. Supp. 527 (D. Md. 1956), probable jurisdiction noted, 25 U.S.L. WEEK
3103 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1956) (No. 289). Smith's conviction was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on the ground that the word
"stolen" includes, in addition to larceny, the crimes of embezzlement and
taking by false pretenses. Smith v. United States, 233 F.2d 744 (9th
Cir. 1956).
Although the common-law courts construed "stealing" as the
equivalent of larceny,' "stealing" is not itself a technical legal concept, but
to be made between civil and criminal remedies but provided only for civil damages.
Brief for Appellant app. C, p. 13. Similarly, the Pennsylvania statute provides only
for criminal penalties. The court of appeals interpreted the Ohio requirement of an
election as indicative of legislative intent to limit the remedies under the statute.
Id. at 20. This interpretation of the Ohio statute is open to question, since it is more
likely that the election requirement was inserted to avoid a double penalty, civil and
criminal.
29. E.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; Clemons v. Board
of Education, 228 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1956) ; Fayson v. Beard, 134 F. Supp. 379 (E.D.
Tex. 1955).
1. 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1952). The maximum penalty is five years and $5,000 fine.
2. See, e.g., State v. Frost, 289 S.W. 895, 897 (Mo. 1926) ; Gardiner v. State, 55
N.J.L. 17, 24, 26 AtI. 30, 33 (1892). Such a construction was inevitable, since larceny
was the only form of criminal taking which existed at common law. Robbery was
considered an aggravated form of larceny. The first English statute making em-
bezzlement a crime was the statute of 39 GEo. 3, c. 85 (1799). The first statute making
obtaining property by false pretenses a crime was that of 30 Ggo. 2, c. 24 (1757).
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a popular term that means "taking the personal property of another for
one's own use without right or law . . ." 3 and is broad enough to
include embezzlement and taking by false pretenses as well as larceny.4
The courts are divided as to whether the Dyer Act employs the popular
meaning of the word or its common-law usage.5 Courts which have taken
the former view hold that the intent of Congress, as shown by the act's
purpose, is sufficiently clear to justify applying the act to embezzlement
and taking by false pretenses. Courts reaching the opposite result rely
mainly on two maxims of statutory construction: common-law terms in a
statute are presumed to have been used in their common-law sense; 6
and ambiguous language in a penal statute must be construed in favor of
the defendant.T
The first maxim is inapposite to construction of the word "stolen"
in the Dyer Act, for it premises that "stolen" is a common-law term and
thus assumes the usage in issue. A similar but more applicable maxim
is that a term having both a popular and a technical meaning is presumed
to have been used in its popular sense in the absence of a contrary legis-
lative intent.8 The second maxim cited by courts limiting "stolen" to
common-law larceny, that ambiguous language in a penal statute must be
construed in favor of the defendant, has a twofold purpose: to insure that
statutes give clear warning of the conduct which is declared criminal, and
to guard against judicial expansion of offenses beyond the legislative
3. United States v. Adcock, 49 F. Supp. 351, 353 (W.D. Ky. 1943). BLACK, LAW
DIcTIoNARY 1023 (4th ed. 1951) and WZBsi R, N~w INTZRNATIONAL DIcTIoNARY 1393
(2d ed. 1949) give a similar definition.
4. Larceny at common law was the taking and carrying away of the personal
goods of another with the felonious intent to convert them to one's own use. Em-
bezzlement is defined by most statutes as the felonious conversion or appropriation
by a servant, bailee or other named person of money or property lawfully held by
him under a relation of trust or confidence with the owner. Property is obtained by
false pretenses when the owner surrenders possession and title in reliance on a false
representation intentionally made by the receiver as to a past or existing fact. A com-
mon instance of the latter is payment by means of a check which the maker knows
to be worthless. See CLARK & MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF CRIMES 405,
482-83, 507-08 (5th ed. 1952).
5. The Fifth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits, and another district court of the Fourth
Circuit, are in accord with the Turley case. Murphy v. United States, 206 F.2d 571
(5th Cir. 1953) ; Ackerson v. United States, 185 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1950) ; Hite v.
United States, 168 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1948); Ex Parte Atkinson, 84 F. Supp. 300
(E.D.S.C. 1949). These cases involve the crime of obtaining property by false pre-
tenses, but the reasoning would apply to embezzlement as well. The Sixth Circuit
is in accord with the Smith case. Breece v. United States, 218 F2d 819 (6th Cir.
1954) ; see also United States v. Sircurella, 187 F2d 533, 534 (2d Cir. 1951) (dictum).
These cases involve the crimde of embezzlement, but the reasoning would apply to false
pretenses also. But see Collier v. United States, 190 F.2d 473, 477 (6th Cir. 1951).
6. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59 (1911); United States
v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 630 (1818); United States v. Brandenburg, 144
F.2d 656, 659 (3d Cir. 1944).
7. See Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83-84 (1955); Chase v. Curtis, 113
U.S. 452, 463 (1885).
8. See It re Anderson, 34 Cal. App. 2d 48, 51, 92 P.2d 1020, 1022 (1939) ; Mc-
Cullagh v. Fortune, 76 N.D. 669, 679, 38 N.W.2d 771, 777 (1949). Some of the cases
which cite this maxim deal with terms whose technical meaning is scientific or com-
mercial. The basic problem, however, is the same: how to choose between the common
and the specialized meanings of a word.
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design 9 The efficacy of the warning function is perhaps questionable in
these cases, since it is unlikely that potential thieves consult the statute
before acting, but nevertheless it would be reasonable to apply the Dyer
Act to situations involving embezzlement or false pretenses because the
ordinary understanding of the word "stolen" includes these offenses.10
Furthermore, avoidance of judicial expansion of offenses, while undoubtedly
a worthy objective, merely raises the question whether the statutory term
is sufficiently clear to justify a conclusion that Congress intended to make
the conduct in question an offense. There appears adequate support for
the affirmative answer to this question reached by the Smith case. Al-
though there is no legislative history specifically relating to the word
"stolen" in the Dyer Act, the act was prompted by a sharp rise in the-
activities of organized gangs of automobile thieves' 1 and its purpose is
clear: to prevent interstate trafficking in "stolen" automobiles beyond the
effective reach of state police power.12 For this p irpose the particular form
of taking seems irrelevant; problems of interstate enforcement are present
whether an automobile is taken by larceny or by some other form of theft.13
It appears, therefore, that a construction of "stolen" to include embezzlement
and false pretenses more accurately reflects the intent of the Congress.' 4
At the same time, this result is sound in terms of the development of the
law of theft. In this area the ad hoc evolution of the criminal law 1- has
9. Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 349 (1948) ; McBoyle v. United States,
283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) ; Caudill v. State, 224 Ind. 531, 534, 69 N.E.2d 549, 550 (1946).
10. Illustrative are two earlier Dyer Act cases in which defendants had obtained
cars by false pretenses. Pleas of guilty were entered in each, the defendant, attorneys
and judge in each case believing that cars obtained by false pretenses were covered.
Following the decision in Hite v. United States, 168 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1948), how-
ever, both defendants were released on the ground that their pleas and the judgments
had been entered under a misconception of fact and law. United States v. O'Carter,
91 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Iowa 1949); Ex Parte Atkinson, 84 F. Supp. 300 (E.D.S.C.
1949).
11. See H.R. Riw. No. 312, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919); S. Rls'. No. 202, 66th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1919); 58 CONG. R c. 5470-78, 6433-35 (1919).
12. See id. at 5471.
13. To the individual automobile owner, for whose protection the Dyer Act was
passed, takings by embezzlement and false pretenses are actually more serious than
those by larceny. The standard auto theft insurance policy, in the majority of juris-
dictions, is construed to exclude compensation for such losses. See Annot., 48 A.L.R.
2d 8 (1956).
14. The Turley case makes the further argument that other sections of the U.S.C.,
in dealing with the three types of theft, use much broader language than the Dyer
Act. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 641, 656, 1704 (1952). This. comparison ignores the fact
that those sections are intended to punish theft per se, whereas the Dyer Act punishes
interstate transportation following a theft. There was less reason for Congress to
define stealing so carefully in this context. The fact that the act specifically defines"motor vehicle" and "interstate or foreign commerce" emphasizes this difference.
15. Originally, the offense of theft was limited to taking property from the actual
possession of the owner by trespass. The doctrine of constructive possession then
brought many cases within the scope of this offense where there was in fact no tres-
pass but actual possession was obtained by a wrongdoer through some trick or artifice
(i.e., larceny by trick) or where, under certain relationhips, the actual possession was
obtained bona fide but the property was subsequently misappropriated (e.g., servants
who convert a chattel entrusted to them for a specific purpose; carriers who break
bulk). Where the courts refused to extend the trespass fiction and the wrongdoer was
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led to technical distinctions and inconsistencies16 serving no practical
purpose and tending to frustrate the administration of justice.17 The
modem legislative trend is to avoid this confusion by consolidation of these
separate offenses against property into one, based on the underlying
characteristics of the conduct involved: unlawful appropriation of the
property of others.' s  Modem courts called upon to construe statutes
such as the Dyer Act, which uses the word "stolen" without defining it,
should recognize the common character of these old offenses. Where the
courts have an opportunity to contribute to making the law of theft more
rational and workable, they should not reinforce historical technicialities
on the strength of maxims alone.
Government Corporations-
WHERE RFC HOLDS TITLE TO SURPLUS INDUSTRIAL
PROPERTY BUT LACKS POSSESSION AND CONTROL,
LESSEE MUST PAY LOCAL TAXES
During World War II certain industrial property in Muskegon,
Michigan, was conveyed to the Defense Plant Corporation, a subsidiary
of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, to be used for a war plant.
Shortly thereafter, the property was leased to a manufacturer of airplane
engines. Under the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act, govern-
recognized as initially having rightful possession, it was necessary to create by statute
the separate offenses of embezzlement and false pretenses, the latter applying where
the wrongdoer obtained actual title. See PARLIAMENTARY COMmIIoNERS oN CRIm-
INAL LAW, FIRST R.ZORT 27-28 (1834).
16. E.g., fraud in obtaining actual possession was held to prevent the lawful pass-
ing of a temporary interest in property, thereby constituting larceny by trick, but
fraud in obtaining title did not prevent the entire interest from passing and consti-
tuted no common-law offense. Also, a servant who converted property entrusted to
him by his master was guilty of larceny, since he had mere "custody" and his master
technically retained "possession," but if he converted property given him by a third
person for delivery to the master, he committed no crime; a carrier who stole the
entire bulk entrusted to him was guilty of no crime at common law, but if he broke
the package open and stole only part of it, he was guilty of larceny. Id. at 6-8.
17. As examples of the confusion which these distinctions have produced in the
cases, see Commonwealth v. O'Malley, 97 Mass. 584 (1867) (defendant, having been
acquitted of larceny, was convicted of embezzlement; this conviction was set aside
on the ground that the proof established larceny) ; People v. Sing, 42 Cal. App. 385,
183 Pac. 865 (1919). See also Notes, 20 COLUm. L. REv. 318 (1920); 22 MINN. L.
Rv. 211 (1938); Comment, 30 YAM L.J. 613 (1921).
18. Some states have completely abolished the procedural consequences of the
distinctions between larceny, embezzlement and false pretenses, consolidating these
offenses into one. E.g., MAss. ANN. LAWs c. 266, §30; c. 277, §§ 39-41 (1956) ; N.Y.
PEN. LAW § 1290. Others have effected partial consolidation. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 9-1114 (Bums 1956); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21-553 (1949); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 165 (Supp. 1956) (defendant indicted for false pretenses may be convicted
although the evidence proves larceny); MicH. Com. LAws § 767.69 (1948) (pros-
ecutor may join counts for more than one offense and need not elect at trial). The
English Larceny Act, 1916, 6 & 7 Gno. 5, c. 50, § 44 provides that where the proof
at trial does not establish the criminal taking charged, the jury may find the defend-
ant guilty of that form of taking which is established by the evidence.
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mental immunity from local taxation on the property was waived.' In
1946 the RFC declared the plant "surplus" under the Surplus Property
Act of 1944,2 and subsequently transferred "possession and control, and
accountability" 3 for the plant to the War Assets Administration for
disposal, although the RFC retained title. The lessee, however, continued to
operate the plant under a new lease from the RFC acting through the
War Assets Administration. 4 In 1953, under a term of the lease requiring
the lessee to pay all taxes which might become due on the property, lessee
paid under protest a $143,630 general property tax to the Township of
Muskegon. Lessee then sued the township to recover the sum on the
theory that the property, having been transferred to the War Assets
Administration (now succeeded by the General Services Administration 5),
was immune from local taxation because it was no longer subject to the
RFC Act's tax immunity waiver. The Supreme Court of Michigan,
denying recovery, held that the tax immunity waiver remained in effect
despite the transfer, since title was still in the RFC. Continental Motors
Corp. v. Muskegon, 346 Mich. 141, 77 N.W.2d 370 (1956).
The Surplus Property Act of 1944 provided for disposal of large
amounts of property acquired by the United States for the war effort and
no longer needed in the peacetime economy.0 When property owned by a
government corporation was declared "surplus," its control, custody and
responsibility were transferred to a disposal agency such as the regional
office of the War Assets Administration, 7 which then proceeded to "dispose"
1. 47 STAT. 10 (1932), 15 U.S.C. § 607 (1952). A 1948 act made RFC property
liable to special local assessments in addition to local taxes. 62 STAT. 265 (1948), 15
U.S.C. § 607 (1952). In the absence of an express waiver, the United States is immune
from local taxation. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
2. C. 479, 58 STAT. 765.
3. Instant case at 144, 77 N.W,2d at 371. 32 C.F.R. § 8310.4 (Supp. 1946) pro-
vides: "[T]he property shall be assigned to the disposal agency which shall promptly
undertake to work out with the owning agency mutually satisfactory arrangements for
the disposal agency's assumption of the care and handling of, and accountability for,
the property covered by the declaration." The duties of the disposal agency consisted of
paying any taxes or rentals which became due on the property, making any repairs
necessary for the protection and maintenance of the property, renewing any lease
relating to the property and requesting from the owning agency any papers or docu-
ments necessary to the disposal of such property. The RFC's only task was to place the
property in a normal standby condition and to transmit on demand to the disposal
agency any documents necessary in the disposal of the property.
4. In the summer of 1945 the Defense Plant Corporation was dissolved by a Joint
Resolution of the Senate and the House of Representatives and its assets were trans-
ferred to the RFC. 59 STAT. 310 (1945), 7 U.S.C. § 176 (1952). The lease between the
RFC and plaintiff was cancelled as of October 31, 1950. On September 18, 1950, RFC
acting through the General Services Administration gave an interim permit to the
Army Ordnance Corps to use and occupy the premises. Army Ordnance in turn entered
into an agreement with the plaintiff which gave plaintiff a right to occupy and use
the plant as of June 1952.
5. Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, 63 STAT. 381, 5
U.S.C. § 630c (1952).
6. See Surplus Property Act of 1944, c. 479, purpose cl. and § 2, 58 STAT. 765, 766.
7. 32 C.F.R. § 8301.12(b) (Supp. 1946). Other disposal agencies were the Navy
Department, the Maritime Commission, the Department of Agriculture, the National
Housing Agency and the Federal Works Agency. See 32 C.F.R. § 8301.2 (Supp. 1946)
for breakdown of agencies.
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of the property to other federal agencies, local governments, non-profit
institutions or private bidders.8 In practice, however, the rapid disposition
contemplated by the act 9 did not materialize; many "surplus" industrial
properties remain in this pre-disposal status even today.'0 The Surplus
Property Act contained no provision as to operation of the RFC Act's
tax immunity waiver with respect to these properties between their transfer
to the disposal agency and final disposition. Nevertheless, it was recognized
that removal of surplus industrial properties from local tax rolls would
create a serious economic problem for local government units in the critical
reconversion period." Therefore, utilizing the Surplus Property Act's
failure to require their assumption of title, the disposal agencies left title in
the RFC so that the tax immunity waiver could be continued.12 Accord-
ingly, local property taxes were paid by the disposal agency or, pursuant
to contract terms, by lessees such as the instant plaintiff.'3 Both the
Comptroller General and Congress apparently acquiesced in this practice.14
In 1952, however, the United States Court of Claims in Sedgwick
County v. United States "I held that, when "control and accountability"
passed to the War Assets Administration, the RFC was left with only "bare
title" and the tax immunity waiver was no longer in effect; since the RFC
had declared the property surplus to its "needs and responsibilities" and
had neither responsibility for nor the right to use the property-even
though the lessee held technically from the RFC-there was no reason to
continue the waiver.' 6 Following this decision the Comptroller General
ordered all disposal agencies to discontinue tax payments on surplus prop-
erties in their custody.' 7 The consequent adverse effect on local economies
from the sudden removal of such properties from local tax rolls led Congress
in 1955 to provide for federal payments in lieu of taxes to state and local
taxing authorities suffering such losses, 18 but this legislation was prospec-
8. Surplus Property Act of 1944, c. 479, §§ 11-13, 58 STAr. 769.
9. Surplus Property Act of 1944, c. 479, § 2(r), 58 STAT. 766.
10. See H.R. Ri,. No. 1453, U.S. CODM CONG. & AD. Nzws, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.
3119 (1955).
11. See id. at 3115-17.
12. See 32 Comp'. GxN. 164, 166 (1952).
13. See H.R. REP. No. 1453, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nzws, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.
3115 (1955).
14. See 27 Comp. Gmr. 561 (1948), wherein the Comptroller General stated that
taxation of surplus RFC property could be avoided if title was passed by the RFC
to the government disposal agency, thus apparently recognizing the validity of tax
payments where the RFC held title. Congress, when it amended the RFC Act in 1943,
62 STAT. 265 (1948), 15 U.S.C. § 607 (1952), made no provision with respect to chang-
ing the practice.
15. 123 Ct. Cl. 304, 105 F. Supp. 995 (1952).
16. Cf. United States v. Shofner Iron & Steel, 168 F2d 286 (9th Cir. 1948),
holding that when property is declared surplus, and control and custody is sur-
rendered to the War Assets Administration, the United States is the real party in
interest for purposes of an action of ejectment.
17. 32 ComP. Gw. 164 (1952). As late as August 1955, lessees of surplus RFC
property were paying local taxes. See H.R. Ri. No. 1453, U.S. CoD CoNG. & AD.
Nxws, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3123 (1955).
18. 69 STAT. 721 (1955), 40 U.S.C. §§ 521-24 (Supp. III, 1956).
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tive only and hence did not replace 1952-1955 tax losses. In refusing to
follow Sedgwick County, the instant court reasoned that the changes in
the property's status made no difference for the purpose of tax immunity,
inasmuch as the lessee had continued to operate his factory as before and
the RFC still held title. The effect is to raise the possibility of suits by
numerous local taxing units 1 to collect several millions 20 in delinquent
taxes on such properties for the years 1952-1955.
Since title to the property was in the RFC, there was adequate
doctrinal basis for the instant court's decision that the waiver still applied.21
However, notwithstanding such doctrine, the Sedgwick County court
looked through title to conclude that the statement declaring the property
"surplus," together with the transfer of "control" to the War Assets
Administration, indicated that the RFC no longer had enough interest in
the property to invoke the waiver. The title concept may not alone provide
sufficient basis for decision, but neither do the factors relied on in
Sedgwick County. The RFC's declaration and the transfer of "control"
were mere formalities of the disposal process, having no real effect on the
property's use; in Sedgwick County as well as in the instant case the lessee
continued to operate his plant without change. A more realistic and
constructive approach would be to examine the factual situation in terms of
the congressional purpose for waiving tax immunity under the RFC Act.P
In waiving such immunity there were two aims: to deny RFC enterprises
an artificial cost advantage over private competitors, and to insure that
local taxing authorities would not lose important revenue sources.P
Equal concern existed for such objectives during the post-war reconversion
period,2 4 and Congress, in stating the objectives of the Surplus Property
19. In most jurisdictions the statute of limitations does not run against the state in
collecting local taxes. See, e.g., TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 7329 (1948) ; OHIO Rxv. CODE
ANN. § 5719.08 (Page 1954), Wasttney v. Schott, 58 Ohio St. 410, 51 N.E. 34 (1898).
However, where state law permits collection of delinquent realty taxes only by a
foreclosure action against the land, and title to the property in question has since been
transferred to the United States, a special act of Congress would be required to confer
jurisdiction on the Court of Claims to entertain a suit against the United States. See
Sedgwick County v. United States, 123 Ct. Cl. 304, 105 F. Supp. 995 (1952). The
Court of Claims, of course, may well adhere to its own decision on the merits in the
Sedgwick County case, notwithstanding the instant decision.
20. As of July 1955, the Bureau of the Budget estimated that more than $3 million
in annual tax payments were in issue, not including those on properties whose title had
by that date been transferred to the Department of Defense. See H.R. REP. No. 1453,
U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3124 (1955).
21. The person having legal title to property is ordinarily regarded as the owner
thereof for purposes of taxation. See, e.g., Tracy v. Reed, 38 Fed. 69 (C.C.D. Ore.
1889).
22. The RFC Act was used during the depression as a means of instilling capital
into the national economy. The purpose clause of the act indicates that the corporate
machinery was set up as a method of providing emergency facilities for aid in
financing agriculture, commerce and industry. 47 STAT. 5 (1932), 15 U.S.C. § 601
(1952). For a complete review of the functions of the RFC, see 8 BROOKLYN L. R.v.
158 (1938).
23. See 75 CONG. R~c. 2074-86 (1932).
24. While the economic crisis of the thirties had passed, reconversion during the
1940's created an equally critical economic situation throughout the country. Many local
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Act, reaffirmed its desire to maintain competition and avoid disruption of
local economies. If Congress intended to prevent the RFC from obtain-
ing a tax advantage, it seems unlikely that it intended such an advantage
for a private corporation leasing RFC property. To allow the instant
plaintiff tax immunity would frustrate both objectives of the tax immunity
waiver. Furthermore, the traditional reason for government tax im-
munity-preventing local governing units from interfering with federal
operations 26--is not present here since the lessee rather than the govern-
ment is operating the plant and paying the tax.2 7 While this may not be
true in cases where there is no lessee, Congress has waived RFC tax
immunity without reference to leases of the property, for the local economic
needs are the same regardless of any lease. 8 Therefore, so long as the
RFC's title supplies a doctrinal justification for invoking the waiver, the
property should be subject to local taxation.
Torts-
VIOLATION OF CAB MINIMUM ALTITUDE REGULATION
AS EVIDENCE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
Plaintiff's decedent, while piloting a Piper Cub along the Suseque-
hanna River in Pennsylvania, struck defendant's power line which crossed
the river. The plane crashed and decedent suffered injuries from which
he later died. At the time of the collision the plane was flying at an
altitude of 185 feet. In a wrongful death action against the power
company by decedent's administrator, the trial court granted a non-suit
at the close of plaintiff's case, holding that decedent's flight at less than
500 feet in violation of the state aeronautics commission's minimum altitude
regulation 1 was contributory negligence and that such negligence was the
government units were largely dependent for revenue on taxes which had been col-
lected from government corporations located in their jurisdictions. See Hearings
Before the Serrate Committee on Government Operatiom, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 104-43
(1955).
25. Surplus Property Act of 1944, c. 479, §§ 2(d), (j), 58 STAT. 766.
26. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Van Brocklin
v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151 (1886) ; United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174,
176-82 (1944).
27. The argument might be advanced that the cost of lessee's real property taxes
will be passed on to the government in the form of a lower rental price and therefore
the taxes will become a burden upon the federal government. Such a contention has
been rejected in similar cases. See, e.g., Alabama v. King, 314 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1941).
28. The fact that the 1955 federal act providing for payments in lieu of taxes, 69
STAT. 721 (1955), 40 U.S.C. §§ 521-24 (Supp. III, 1956), has since alleviated the
economic problem of local units should not, of course, affect collection of taxes that
may have been legally due prior to that time.
1. PA. Civ. Aimo. R.G. § 58.
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proximate cause of the accident.2 On appeal the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court reversed, holding that a CAB regulation permitting flight at less
than 500 feet over open water 3 controlled rather than the state rule;
since there had been no violation of the federal regulation, the questions
of contributory negligence and proximate cause should have been sub-
mitted to the jury. Yoffee v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 123 A.2d
636 (Pa. 1956).
In tort law the "reasonable man" standard is usually employed to
determine negligence. Often, however, the courts turn to criminal statutes
for a more definite standard.4 Although such statutes ordinarily do not
purport to govern civil liability, their standards are adopted by the courts
as ready-made tests for negligence. This practice is justifiable on the
ground that the legislative enactment expresses public policy as to the
types of conduct which society deprecates or, conversely, seeks to protect.5
Furthermore, the statutory standard may be the product of expert
knowledge needed to assess conduct in that special field but which is lacked
by the court and jury." The practice has been extended to include
standards borrowed from administrative regulations. 7 When a court
employs a statutory or administrative standard it does so on its own
initiative, and the standard becomes that of the court only because the
court accepts it.8  Since the court is not directly enforcing the statute
or regulation from which the standard is drawn, the fact that the person
whose conduct is to be judged may not be subject to the statute or regula-
tion is irrelevant to the propriety of the court's use of that standard.9
The instant case raises the problems of choosing between a federal
and a state regulation as a standard of care, of interpreting the rule
selected and of giving appropriate effect to a conclusion that the rule was
not breached. At the time of the accident the federal and state minimum
altitude regulations differed: the state rule prohibited flight at less than
500 feet,' ° while the federal rule allowed such flight when over "open
2. Yoffee v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 67 Dauph. Co. Rep. 344 (Dauphin
County, Pa. C.P. 1955).
3. 14 C.F.R. § 60.17(c) (Supp. 1955) (CAB General Flight Rules).
4. MoiR-s, ToRTs 64 (1953).
5. PR0Ss R, ToRTs 154 (2d ed. 1955) ; see Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes
in Negligence Actions, 49 CoLum. L. Rzv. 21, 22 (1949). The following cases, among
others discussed by Morris, are typical of those in which the courts, following policies
laid down by criminal statutes which did not purport to extend civil liability, imposed
civil liability where common-law no-duty rules would have precluded it: Rimco
Realty & Investment Corp. v. LaVigne, 114 Ind. App. 211, 50 N.E2d 953 (1943);
Tvedt v. Wheeler, 70 Minn. 161, 72 N.W. 1062 (1897). Contra, Wynn v. Sullivan,
294 Mass. 562, 3 N.E.2d 236 (1936).
6. Morris, The Role of Administrative Safety Measures it; Negligence Actions, 28
TtXAs L. Rzv. 143, 144 (1949).
7. Id. at 144-46. In Pennsylvania violation of an administrative safety regulation
is evidence of negligence. Weimer v. Westmoreland Water Co., 127 Pa. Super. 201,
208, 193 Atl. 665, 668 (1937).
8. Clinkscales v. Carver, 22 Cal. 2d 72, 136 P.2d 777 (1943); Phoenix Refining
Co. v. Powell, 251 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Ct Civ. App. 1952).
9. See cases cited in note 8 supra.
10. PA. Civ. Anao. Rw. § 58.
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water or sparsely populated areas." " The trial court held that because
the flight was intra-state and not in a federal airway the state rule con-
trolled,'2 failing to recognize the irrelevance of jurisdiction for this pur-
pose.' 3 Evidently the supreme court made the same mistake.' 4 The
court should have examined the qualitative distinctions which suggest that
one standard or the other is more deserving of judicial respect in the
particular case. A comparison of the rule-making policies of the Civil
Aeronautics Board and the Pennsylvania Aeronautics Commission indi-
cates that the federal rule is the product of more modem expert thinking
on air safety than is the state rule. The CAB, before issuing the amend-
ment which cast the federal rule in its present form, submitted an advance
draft to the aircraft industry for its recommendations and approval.25
Thus, the CAB regulation reflects not only the experience of its own
staff of experts and field agents but also that of people in private industry
who are most likely to be familiar with the safety requirements of air
flight. The Pennsylvania Aeronautics Commission, on the other hand,
defers (if somewhat belatedly) to the judgment of the CAB, in apparent
recognition of the latter's qualification to set aviation safety standards
and from a probable desire to achieve uniformity in these regulations. 6
Thus, there seems adequate justification for the court's choice of the
federal standard.
Having selected the federal standard, it was necessary to interpret
it. This case marks the first attempt by any court or administrative body
to interpret the words "open water" in the federal regulationY' The
instant court interpreted the term as an offshore equivalent of "sparsely
populated area," considering the width of the river and the absence of
vessels or swimmers at the site of the accident and concluding that it
11. 14 C.F.R § 60.17(c) (Supp. 1955).
12. Yoffee v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 67 Dauph. Co. Rep. 344, 359-60
(Dauphin County, Pa. C.P. 1955).
13. See text and citations at note 8 supra.
14. In deciding this point the supreme court said, "If there were conflict between
the Pennsylvania regulations and the Federal regulations the latter would predom-
inate. However, aside from the superiority of the federal regulations, the facts in
the case specifically adapt themselves to the Federal regulations since the pilot at the
time of the fatal mishap was flying over 'open water,' the situation described under
Subsection (c) Of Regulation 60.17." Instant case at 640. From its use of the word"predominate" it may be inferred that the court viewed the choice as dependent upon
jurisdictional power.
15. See 12 Fm. Rz. 5547 (1947).
16. Shortly after the accident in question, the state rule was brought up to date
with the federal by inclusion of the open-water and sparsely-populated-areas excep-
tions, thus making the two substantially the same. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
Department of Commerce, Pennsylvania Aeronautics Commission, Amendments to
Regulations, July 18, 1950.
17. "I know of no case in which the Civil Aeronautics Board, or any judicial
tribunal, has defined the term 'open water' in Section 60.17 of the Civil Air Regula-
tions, nor am I aware of any standard for determining whether a particular body
of water is 'open water."' Letter from S. W. Bobskill, CAA Regional Attorney, New
York International Airport to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Aug. 30,
1956, on file in Biddle Law Library.
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was "open water" within the meaning of the regulation.' s However,
flight within 500 feet of vessels or swimmers would clearly violate the
CAB standard, for the rule qualifies its authorization of low altitude
flight over "open water" and "sparsely populated areas" by adding that:
"In such event the aircraft shall not be operated closer than 500 feet to
any person, vessel, vehicle, or structure." 19 If "open water" is defined
by reference to the proximity of vessels or other obstructions the qualifi-
cation would thus seem meaningless, for in effect it would merely enjoin
low altitude flight over water that is not "open." " Nevertheless, since
"openness" is relational and not a quality of the water, there appears
no more adequate basis for its definition. The instant court did not attempt
to define the scope of the exception as qualified, but at least one CAB
agent 2 has recognized the regulation's ambiguity and resolved it on an
operating level by ignoring the word "open" and focusing on the qualifica-
tion, construing the rule as a whole to permit flight at any altitude over
a water surface so long as a distance of 500 feet is maintained from any
obstruction.2 The latter construction eliminates any need to evaluate the
characteristics of the surrounding area. Under either approach there was
no violation in the instant case unless the power line itself be considered
a "structure" within the meaning of the regulation. Although the court
did not face this question, a recent unreported decision of the CAB 23
ruled that: "[W]hile the 500 feet distance must be maintained from sub-
stantial structures, such as the multiwire power lines which are supported
on large steel bases, simple (indeed, hardly visible) structures like a single
wire strung from ordinary telephone or telegraph poles in a rural area, are
18. Instant case at 640-41. The trial court had interpreted "open water" as a body
of water on which navigation would be unimpeded, and found that at the site of the
accident the Susquehanna, because of its islands, rocks, power lines and ferry, was
not such a body of water. The trial court also placed some reliance on United States
v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249 (1893), which defined the term "high seas" in a federal
statute. Yoffee v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 67 Dauph. Co. Rep. 344, 358-59
(Dauphin County, Pa. C.P. 1955).
19. 14 C.F.R. § 60.17(c) (Supp. 1955).
20. Of course, a 500-foot radius from each of several vessels may leave an area
between them in which a pilot might fly at low altitude without violating the regu-
lation, if "open water" is defined simply as that beyond 500 feet of any obstruction.
Cf. note 22 infra. To prohibit such flight a different definition of "open water" would
be required, but if such definition is not related to distance from obstructions it would
leave little basis for warning pilots of an impending violation unless it could be
formulated with greater preciseness than the present regulation seems to offer.
21. Interview with Mr. L. S. Probst, CAA Supervising Agent (charged with
enforcement of CAB flight rules in the Philadelphia area with respect to light air-
craft), Echelon Airport, Haddonfield, N.J., Aug. 24, 1956. See also note 22 infra.
22. "As a practical matter it has been our experience that except where the water
is bordered by a sparsely settled area, the 500-foot separation requirement fixes the
permissible altitude of the aircraft." Letter from S. W. Bobskill, CAA Regional Attor-
ney, New York International Airport to the University of Pennsylvania Law Re-
view, Aug. 30, 1956, on file in Biddle Law Library.
23. Louis E. Schwartz, C.A.B. Dkt. No. SR-5-778, June 30, 1953. (Initial decision
by H. G. Moorhead, CAB Hearing Examiner.)
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not within the meaning of the section's prohibition." 24 It appears, there-
fore, that the court reached the correct result.
Violation of this regulation may be evidence of the pilot's contributory
negligence, but compliance is not necessarily evidence that he was free of
such negligence. CAB air traffic regulations are designed to insure the
safety of persons and property on the ground, not to protect the pilot's
safety.25 Therefore, flight at less than 500 feet as permitted by the regu-
lation in question, while not endangering persons or property on the
surface, might still endanger the pilot and thus constitute contributory
negligence.2 6 The CAB recognizes that low flight, although not vio-
lating this regulation, may still be unsafe.2 7  The open-water and sparsely-
populated-areas exceptions to the 500-foot rule were adopted to legalize
low altitude flights necessary for utilitarian reasons. 28 The regulation
does not authorize low flight over open water or sparsely populated areas
under all circumstances,2 9 or rule on its advisability under particular
circumstances. The court, by preserving for the jury the question of
contributory negligence, has properly limited the effect of a showing of
compliance with the regulation.
24. Letter from H. G. Moorhead, CAB Hearing Examiner, Washington, D.C.
to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Oct. 10, 1956, on file in Biddle Law
Library.
25. Armour & Moorhead, Analysis of CAB Precedents in Safety Enforcement
Cases, 17 J. Am L. & CoM. 54-55 & n.7 (1950).
26. RsTAEnmxNT, ToRTs § 463 (1934).
27. 14 C.F.R. § 60.12(b) (Supp. 1955) (examples of careless or reckless air-
craft operation).
28. CAA, SAvty Buu.. No. 171-46 (1950), quoted in Brief for Appellee, pp.
34-35.
29. See 14 C.F.R. § 60.17(a) (Supp. 1955) (prohibiting any flight below an alti-
tude which will permit a safe emergency landing).
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